Canada’s “Americas Strategy”: Why the Americas? What’s the Strategy?

by Laura Macdonald, Carleton University and Arne Ruckert, University of Ottawa


With the electoral victory of Conservative leader Stephen Harper in 2006, Canadian foreign policy makers have again rediscovered Latin America. In various speeches and announcements, Stephen Harper has signaled a renewed interest in the region. In July 2007, during a tour of the Americas, Harper stated that a re-engagement with the Americas would be a top priority of his administration. The focus of the new strategy was to be promotion of economic ties (especially through new free trade agreements), and support for democracy and security in the region. 
The most recent sign of Canada’s tilt toward the Americas is the invitation of three leaders from the Americas – René Préval of Haiti, Bruce Golding of Jamaica and outgoing Colombian president Álvaro Uribe – to join an “outreach” session at the G8 meeting in June.  Traditionally these sessions involve leaders from African countries, and focus on development efforts among the poorest nations on that continent.  Leaders from Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa were also invited, but the invitation of the three heads of state from the Americas signals the Harper government’s shift in strategy.  Préval, Golding and Uribe, all friends of Harper and ideologically compatible, were invited to talk about how the rich countries can help poorer nations deal with security threats like terrorism and organized crimes - not items at the top of the priorities of most developing countries.
This invitation reflects some of the broader problems with Canada’s Americas strategy.  Again, Canada is focusing on a favoured few allies, and shifting the emphasis away from poverty alleviation and Africa, toward Harper’s own priorities – in this case, security.  At the same time, Parliament’s recent approval of the free trade deal with Colombia, despite strong objections from Canadian NGOs and human rights organizations, represents Harper’s other main priority in the Americas – free trade.  In sum, Canada’s recent engagement with the Americas does not adequately respond to the profound changes that have occurred in the Latin American region over the last ten years.  In particular, the heavy focus on the signing of NAFTA-style bilateral or regional free trade and investment agreements with friendly regimes like Colombia shows that the Canadian government remains tied to a neoliberal development model in an era of increased questioning of policies throughout many countries of the Americas.
From Withdrawal to Re-engagement: Canada’s Rediscovery of the Americas
Canada has been on a seemingly never-ending rollercoaster ride in its relations with the hemisphere. Periods of strong engagement have generally been followed by periods of withdrawal from hemispheric activities. The most recent wave of engagement began in the 1990s, after Canada became a permanent member of the OAS.  In the OAS, Canada worked to promote greater attention to democracy in the hemisphere through the establishment of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. Canada also played a leading role in the failed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative.  Canada’s and the United States’ unwillingness to accommodate the demands of post-neoliberal regimes in Brazil, Argentina was an important reason for the eventual foundering of the FTAA negotiations. 
However, by the late 1990s the enthusiasm that was driving Canada’s re-engagement had largely waned. There are multiple reasons for this shift: growing global concerns with poverty in Africa, ultimately translating into a stronger focus on Africa within the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); enhanced security concerns and Canada’s involvement in the US-led ‘War on Terror’; and a serious misalignment between Canadian priorities for the region, such as the FTAA, and the widespread rejection of free market economics among countries of the region.
What, then, explains the Harper government’s new-found enthusiasm for the Americas? Not surprisingly, many commentators attribute Canada’s much-celebrated re-engagement to growing business interests in the region. Canada’s business investments in the Americas are three times higher than investments in Asia, having reached almost CAN$ 100 billion in FDI stocks (assets owned by Canadian multinationals) in 2006. Moreover, trade with Latin America has recently been growing faster than with any other part of the world, with total exports more than doubling from CAN$ 4.17 billion in 2004 to CAN$ 8.68 billion in 2008. The role of business interests as a key driving force behind the foreign policy turn has also been singled out in a volley of speeches and articles by senior policy makers. In a 2007 speech to the House of Commons former foreign minister Maxime Bernier noted that the ultimate goal of the new Americas strategy was to “promote enhanced market access and a level playing field for Canadian businesses” and to “ensure that Canadian business has continued access to this growing market”.
Elements of the “Americas Strategy”
At a practical level, the most obvious aspect of the Canadian government’s Americas strategy to date is the vigorous promotion of bilateral free trade agreements, a move that follows the U.S. example. This emphasis on engaging countries bilaterally represents a significant break from the traditional Canadian foreign policy in the hemisphere which, since Canada joined the OAS demonstrated a strong support for multilateral fora. In contrast, the Harper administration has mainly resorted to bilateral channels to promote neoliberal reforms and, in particular, avoid the stalling of trade and investment liberalization in the wake of the demise of the FTAA. This is part of what DFAIT calls its “aggressive trade negotiation agenda,” aimed at opening the region to Canadian investors and goods (particularly Canadian mining companies) and is in line with Canada’s broader foreign policy objective of deepening Canadian engagement in the Americas, while advancing Canada’s national interests.
In addition to its trade diplomacy, the new strategy also involves an important shift in Canadian aid policy away from a focus on some of the world’s poorest states which are mostly located in Africa. In February 2009, CIDA minister Bev Oda announced the government’s intention to focus on fewer countries than in the past, and to re-concentrate its cooperation efforts on countries in the Americas. The countries selected as focus countries are Bolivia, the Caribbean region, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru. Canada has signed trade agreements with Colombia and Peru, neither of which were previously focus countries, while most of the countries that were eliminated from the list are desperately poor countries in Africa.
Overall, the Americas Strategy is dominated by an emphasis on free trade, Canadian corporate interests, and security.  The rise of post-neoliberal governments in the region represents a unique opportunity to avoid some of the contradictions currently present in Canadian foreign policy, especially the simultaneous promotion of human rights and free markets.  Many of these governments are clearly committed to ideals dear to many Canadians, like  multilateralism, reform of institutions of global governance, and poverty alleviation.   By working with these governments, Canada could carve out a clearly independent policy in the region that reflects the values and priorities of the Canadian population and the majority of Latin Americans.
What Canada should do in the Americas:

• Repair the relationship with Mexico, badly damaged by the Harper government’s decision to impose a visa on visiting Mexicans;
• As in Africa, poverty reduction should be the focus of aid spending.  But the Americas should not be the priority in Canada’s aid policy given higher levels of development and lower poverty levels in the region;
• Look for like-minded allies for Canada’s traditional support for multilateralism  and peacebuilding - Brazil is an obvious candidate;
• Consult widely with Canadian and Latin American civil society about future priorities.

Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruckert are co-editors of Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  Laura Macdonald is a member of the McLeod group.

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Colombia, a focus for increased Canadian trade and – coincidentally, no doubt, a new Canadian aid recipient – struggles with drugs, violence and a North American idea that trade will solve all problems.

A One-note “strategy”? Mr. Harper Goes to Latin America

What message is Canada sending to Latin America? And what does Prime Minister Harper’s visit to the region in August tell us about the state of Canada’s “Americas Strategy”?

When first announced by Mr. Harper in July 2007, the Americas Strategy promised to make Latin America and the Caribbean a top priority for Canadian foreign policy, and committed Canada to playing a “bigger role in the Americas… for the long term.” The three priorities established in the Strategy were to promote democratic governance, prosperity, and security in the region.
Since the strategy was announced, supporters of stronger Canadian engagement with the Americas have signalled their disappointment with Foreign Affairs’ lack of sustained attention to the region. An expected strategy document that might have laid out a more visionary approach apparently stalled in Cabinet and was never released. A recent internal evaluation done by the Office of the Inspector General in Foreign Affairs and obtained by Canadian Press under access-to-information legislation found that the strategy had suffered for lack of funds, focus, and co-ordination.

In the absence of a clear, comprehensive strategy, we were left with a series of flawed trade agreements and the country’s high-profile role in Haiti. The Canadian government signed trade deals with Colombia, a country notorious for high levels of human rights violations, Peru, Costa Rica, and Panama, despite a clear lack of enthusiasm among most Latin Americans for free trade policies. Canada has been pursuing other trade deals, with less success, with the other Central American countries, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and Brazil.

Harper’s six-day trip has reinforced the idea that the government’s real priority is Canadian prosperity, not sustainable development in the region. During the first stop on his trip, he did his best to repair some of the rips in the Canada-Brazil relationship, which has ranged from hostility to indifference in recent years. Canadian exports to Brazil have increased dramatically over the last five years, despite a lacklustre bilateral relationship. Harper and Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rousseff, announced some minor initiatives, like the formation of a Canada-Brazil CEO Forum, and other agreements to boost trade.

Harper next visited Colombia to celebrate the entry into force a week later (August 15th) of the Canada-Colombia free trade agreement. During his trip to Costa Rica, he continued the narrow focus on trade by announcing the decision of the two governments to begin negotiating a new trade agreement dealing with difficult areas not covered in the first agreement, such as government procurement, agriculture, and trade in financial services. Harper and Laura Chinchilla, the Costa Rican president, also committed to increase cooperation in security, tax collection, and air transport. Harper also sent a rather odd message by visiting a hockey rink at a wealthy country club outside of San José that is modelled on a European castle.

Finally, the visit ended on a sour note in Honduras. Harper is the first foreign leader to visit the country since the Organization of American States readmitted the country after its former president, Manuel Zelaya, was overthrown in a military coup. The current government led by Porfirio Lobo came to power in a controversial election, but widespread human rights violations continue. Harper boasted that the deal would help rid the country of poverty and violence: “Trade does, of course, raise people from poverty… Protectionists are selfish and short-sighted in their perspectives”. Meanwhile, demonstrators kept outside the gates at the event begged to differ: they claimed that the deal would contribute to the attack on workers’ rights and line the pockets of Canadian businesses.

In order to win respect in the Americas, the Harper government needs to recognize that there is much more to the relationship than the signing of trade deals which may be perceived as primarily benefitting Canadian corporations. While there well may be benefits to Canada from greater commercial relations with the region, a more sensitive approach is required to address the fact that the image of Canada has become more tarnished in recent years. Canadian companies operating in Latin America, particularly mining companies, have become increasingly the targets of criticism by environmental and human rights organizations and indigenous activists. For example, in May 2011, a delegation from the Wixárika people of northern Mexico presented a letter to the annual shareholders meeting of First Majestic Silver in Vancouver, expressing concerns about the impact the company’s proposed silver mine will have on a sacred site of their people, located in the state of San Luis Potosí. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has ordered the government of Guatemala to suspend operations of Canadian corporation Goldcorp’s Marlin mine to prevent imminent harm to communities living near the mine, an order which the Guatemalan government has failed to comply with. In El Salvador, local human rights organizations charge that deaths of four anti-mining activists are linked to the presence in the region of Vancouver-based Pacific Rim Mining company.
Overall, at a time when Canadian business is increasingly subject to criticism over labour and environmental practices associated with Canadian mining operations, Harper’s trade-focused visit failed to convey the idea that Canada has interests that are higher than the bottom line.

Meanwhile, one country the prime minister missed during his tour was Canada’s “strategic partner” Mexico. Instead, Mexicans had to make do with a visit from foreign minister John Baird, who accompanied Harper on the rest of the tour. The lack of a Mexico stop by Harper seemed to be another snub to our NAFTA partner. Canada’s relationship with Mexico has suffered as a result of the 2009 imposition of the requirement that Mexicans obtain a visa to Canada, and trilateral relations have suffered from the exclusion of Mexico from the recent “perimeter talks” with the United States. Baird and his Mexican counterpart, Patricia Espinosa, discussed such themes as security cooperation, labour mobility, cooperation against transnational organized crime, academic exchanges and scientific cooperation. Baird also told journalists that he had a “significant” discussion about improving security for Canadians visiting Mexico and ensuring effective treatment for cases involving Canadians. None of these discussions signalled that Canada would be taking on a more important role to address security and human rights issues facing Mexicans. Canada could be doing much more to promote democracy, security and human rights in Mexico.

Haiti

This Caribbean island of just over 10 million has suffered grievously through most of its life. Now it is suffering the devastating effects of the January earthquake that has destroyed most of its infrastructure, turning the entire capital into a scrap-heap of collapsed buildings.  Today’s Haiti is a shattered society with 200,000 dead, thousands more maimed and traumatised, and over a million rendered homeless.
Yet this is the same country that gained its independence in 1804, becoming the first slave society to successfully revolt, pushing out their French masters (for which act of defiance they paid over a century of reparations to a haughty France).  The 20th century bought no peace: this is also the country of Papa Doc and later his son who ran voodooism-driven regimes of terror and exploitation for decades. 
With their departure, the country was left a physical and institutional wreck, with shattered population and countryside.  A cycle of coups, gang violence and weak governments ravaged Haiti.  The international community (essentially the US, France and Canada) intervened finally to restore its only real popular leader, Father Aristide, but then found him too radical and ineffective for their taste and ‘facilitated’ his removal into his present exile in South Africa. 
The more pliant replacement Preval government that Canada co-sponsored has emerged as just as weak and maybe even more corrupt, unable to manage either the economy or domestic violence.  What had been the beginnings of a revival of local agriculture was halted by international action and imposed, unthinking free market policies.  Jobless Haitians were driven from their land by cheap food imports. Those who found new jobs, mainly less ‘troublesome’ women, find themselves with few options beyond sub-subsistence wages in mainly foreign-owned, export processing operations.  Some indeed are being smuggled across the border by local mafias to fill the same exploitative jobs in  richer Dominican Republic.
Western aid, despite its scale ($6.5b over period 1990-2008) has been frequently poor quality and paternalistic. Canada has been engaged in Haiti for decades now; it was the second largest bilateral donor in recent years.  Donors and Haitians alike have been frustrated  by corruption, bad administration, low skills, and especially violence through coup, mafia gang, as well as individual acts of terror and rape. While support for infrastructure, legal reform, education and health was all well-intentioned, there was no systemic effort to change the all-pervasive culture of corruption and dysfunctional governance. Massive food aid has just created an even greater sense of dependency.
Where does Haiti go next? What should be Canada’s role in supporting Haitians to rebuild their country?  What do we say in terms of our renewed commitment to neglected and abused kinsfolk of the many thousands of Haitian-Canadians?
Many hope that the earthquake will be a chance to rebuild… not just with new bricks,  but better governance and greater inclusiveness and transparency.  Canadians  as reflected in their $220m worth of individual generosity have shown they wish our aid to be focused --  not on our middle-income trading partners, but on the poorest  and most fragile of developing societies be they in Africa or  Haiti.  We hosted a first conference of donors in Montreal and delivered pledges of a new $400m in New York this spring.  However there is some  confusion as to how much of that ‘pledge’ is really  new  or just old commitments in new declaratory words.
But the core issue is not money. The real challenge is whether donors can find and adopt an approach that is truly locally-owned and led by Haitians, one focused on the needs and aspirations of its poor.  Canada should lead in encouraging its key donor partners, notably the UN, World Bank and US, to change the basic rules of the game.  Ordinary poor Haitians have shown they, as individuals, know how to struggle and survive.  But will we help fight for their rights in the form of open, inclusive government?  If not the old failed state will be soon back. What is needed is a 10-year commitment not just to spend more money, but to see that it reaches the poor, not the already rich and privileged.
There needs to be a basic ‘re-design’ of the country’s governance, creating a society driven by respect for individual human rights.  But is this something that our own government can lead when it is busy closing out human rights-orientated NGOs for supporting other underdogs such as the Palestinians?  Haiti needs a new economic model, one built around micro-finance and small-holder agriculture, not exploitative industrial labour. They need access for all to free basic education and health care; this probably means a decade of budget support.  Can a Canadian government that judges development ‘success’ by results measurable in months have the patience for this long haul? Yes, this country needs new buildings (hopefully in a decentralised mode, away from natural fault lines), but even more importantly it needs a new government committed to economic inclusivity and human security.  Poor Haitians need new skills and space for their dignity.
Can today’s weakened and demoralised CIDA provide this type of creative leadership?  Will it be allowed to play this longer-term role, without looking for flashy ‘flagship’ projects? Can Canadian NGOs build new partnerships with local civil society in a non-patronising manner? Can a re-vamped ‘whole of government’ approach turn around the gaols of our support towards using our peace-keeping military and police support capabilities to improve the lot of ordinary Haitians, to protect them from police brutality, to drive out the mafia gangs that rob the population, rape women? 
If we fail, the issue will not fade from sight.  Haiti is our backyard. The displaced with some skills will steadily flow into Montreal, rather than staying to help rebuild their own country.  A flood of refugees and illegal immigrants will flow into the USA causing human anguish and disruptive violence, especially if they finance their ‘travels’ through drug-trafficking. 
Haitians are our neighbours. They need our committed support to become a viable society as opposed to remaining one of  the most embarrassing symbol of our failed capacity to be good world citizens. 

Why and How the Federal Government Should Fix Foreign Aid

In the coming months, there will be a federal election.  A new or renewed government will have an opportunity to fix Canadian foreign aid.  This is what we recommend:
Introduction

•  The Government of Canada should lead a new non-partisan effort to transform Canada’s foreign-aid policy and the agency that implements it.
• The benefits of this effort will include better poverty-reduction results in poor countries, a boost to Canada’s international reputation, re-energized engagement in global anti-poverty work by Canadians, and a renewed and progressive vision among Canadians of our country’s development role in a complex and volatile world.
• The approach described here is likely to appeal to other political parties, and attract strong support from the many stakeholders in Canada’s development sector, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), CIDA employees, the business community, academia, a growing constituency of concerned, activist young Canadians, diaspora communities and others.  It will also garner strong support from the organizations and countries that benefit (or once benefited) from Canadian development assistance. 

The Changing Context and Nature of Aid

• A new mandate would allow the federal government to engage Canadians in a campaign to re-energize and transform our overseas development assistance (ODA) into a modern policy instrument that effectively projects the vision and values of Canada into the world, and returns Canada to a leadership role as a catalyst of social-justice and human rights.  
• Aid in the 21st century must be re-framed: There must be a decisive shift from old concepts rooted in paternalism, charity and dependence, to new approaches based on mutual social responsibility and structured, sustainable governance involving Southern and Northern citizens operating within more equalized power relations.
• Canada must play a lead role in a broad-based reinvigoration of aid from industrialized countries, which is widely seen as slow, bureaucratic and self-absorbed. It is in danger of eclipse from new donors such as China, Russia, Venezuela, Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose aid has a strong commercial and commodity focus, moves very quickly, and is disdainful of human rights.  
• Changes to the architecture of western aid over the past decade have been entirely focused on state systems, in particular strengthening the centralized power of Finance Ministries across the developing world.  A much stronger role for citizens’ organizations and civil society in general, led by the South, is essential in going forward at all levels: global, regional, national and local. 

The Core Task: Fixing CIDA

• With an annual budget of nearly $3 billion, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is our prime foreign-aid policy instrument.   Its staff is dedicated and skilled, and the agency has in the past been a global innovator in gender equality, evaluation and NGO partnership. However, CIDA has, for far too many years now, underperformed on almost every measure that matters. This chronic underperformance has undermined Canada’s reputation abroad, restricted the effectiveness of CIDA’s partners, and reduced employee morale to alarmingly low levels.  The time for cosmetic reforms is over; the ODA program needs radical change.
• Rather than being a follower of other government departments and a source of budget support for them, the ODA program should become, once again, a global leader, and a pro-active federal foreign policy actor with an independent and protected mandate and budget. 
• We propose a 15-point plan to fix CIDA:
  1. Re-affirm the mandate of the ODA program: sustainable development for poverty reduction in the poorest countries
  2. Ensure that non-ODA foreign-policy objectives related to defence and security, trade and diplomacy are pursued through the Department of National Defence (DND), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and other instruments - not through the ODA agency.
  3. Re-commit to achieving the 0.7% target for aid.
  4. Lodge the prioritization of ODA at the highest political level, with the Prime Minister.
  5. Appoint a senior government Minister, with a full seat at the Cabinet table, to oversee the ODA agency.
  6. Create a new Department for International Co-operation, with a legislated mandate, to implement Canadian ODA policy.
  7. Appoint a high-level, multi-sectoral Advisory Board to the Minister and Deputy Minister of the new Department, with representation from the South as well as Canada (see the Canada Revenue Agency’s Board of Management as one model).
  8. Enforce the Better Aid Act that is already on Parliament’s books.
  9. Streamline the implementation of the federal Accountability Act with respect to ODA spending programs.
  10. Establish and maintain stable, long-term relationships with the new Department’s main country partners.
  11. Decentralize, meaningfully, the new Department’s budget, authority and personnel to country-level offices. 
  12. Expand the role of civil society organizations in implementing the ODA program. 
  13. Re-empower the Canadian Partnership Branch of the new Department.
  14. Allocate 5% of the new Department’s budget for robust and dynamic engagement with Canadians.
  15. More effectively integrate ODA policy formulation with research generated by the International Development Research Centre and other bodies. 

• Other management and personnel changes that must be made  include:
  1. Ending the culture and practice of continuous tinkering and micro-management by ministers and senior managers;
  2. Insisting that senior managers must have extensive overseas field experience;
  3. Reducing the inordinate power of contracts officers vis-à-vis program managers; and
  4. Cutting the embarrassingly slow pace (currently nearly four years!) of bringing a bilateral project from the planning stage to operational status. 
     
• At the same time, other federal departments must stop using CIDA as a cash cow, and focus on their own core functions rather than ODA implementation.
• Overall, we endorse the Canadian Council on International Cooperation’s policy paper on strengthening CIDA, which proposes to create a new Department for International Cooperation with a legislated mandate, a Minister with a full seat in Cabinet, a clear focus on poverty reduction in the poorest countries (which are mostly in Africa) and a robust role for civil society, with 5% of CIDA’s budget to be spent on engaging the Canadian public about development.

Achieving Both Focus and Balance Across the Foreign-Policy Portfolio

• Fixing the ODA program is, in our view, a task of the highest priority and urgency, one that will demand focus and sustained support by the government at the highest levels.  The anti-poverty/development agenda must be robust and dynamic.  However, we also recognize that the government must strike a balance across its various foreign-policy objectives and instruments, which include DFAIT, DND, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada.  This balance has been lost in recent years.  By making the ODA implementation agency stronger and emphasizing poverty reduction as a central tenet of Canadian foreign policy, we believe an effective balance can be achieved.

Taking the Conversation Further

A number of issues deserve further consideration, including, for example: planning the legal and organizational transition from CIDA to the new Department for International Cooperation, achieving an appropriate and sustainable balance across foreign-policy files, identifying a role for the private sector in this effort to implement a new approach to aid, and mapping ways and means of mobilizing political support for this effort.

Aid flows - a cause for deep concern

According to a recent OECD DAC review, although global foreign aid will reach record levels in 2010, it will still be much less than the world’s major donors promised five years ago at the Gleneagles and Millennium + 5 summits. Though a majority of countries will meet their commitments, the underperformance of several large donors means there will be a significant shortfall.  Africa will particularly feel the impact of the reduction receiving less than half of what was promised at Gleneagles in 2005 ($12b rather than $25b).
In 2005 15 members of the EU agreed to reach a minimum target of .51% of GNI (Gross National Income) by 2010.  Some countries, such as Sweden (at 1.03%) the world’s most generous donor, Denmark (at 0.83%) and the United Kingdom (at 0.56%) will exceed that.  Others, such as France (0.46%), Germany (0.40%), Austria (0.37%) and Portugal (0.34%), will fall short, although they will still be higher than Canada at 0.33%. 
At 0.33% of GNI, Canada ranks as one of the least generous donors coming in 18th out of 22. And the situation will get worse over the next four years.  In its March 2010 budget the Conservative government announced that it will freeze foreign-aid spending next year after honouring the final instalment of a decade-old Liberal government promise to double overseas development spending.

Canadian ODA to GNI Performance Ratio

2010-11           0.33 %
2011-12           0.32 %
2012-13           0.30 %
2013-14           0.29 %
2014-15           0.28 %

CCIC Calculations
  The International Assistance Envelope (IAE) will be approximately $5 billion in 2010-11 and it is estimated that Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) for this coming year will be $5.2 billion.  Given a capped budget at 2010-11 levels ($5.2 billion), Canada’s aid performance will decline from 0.33% of GNI in 2010-11 to 0.28% in 2014-15. This will put Canada at the lowest ranking in its history as a donor among the 22 OECD donor countries   - at 18th spot out of 22 in 2010 according to the OECD. Only the United States (0.20%), Japan (0.20%), Greece (0.21%) and Italy (0.20%) rank lower in 2010.
 The Budget goes further than a cap and states that aid spending in future years will be “assessed alongside all other government priorities on a year-by-year basis in the budget”.
There are no details in the budget on new aid priorities such as

• Canada’s pledge to contribute to the fund to rebuild Haiti;
• Canada’s Maternal and Child Health Initiative to be presented to the G8;
• Or the commitment made by Canada in December 2009 at the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference that it would contribute its fair share to a US$30 billion “fast start” climate change fund for the period 2010 to 2012.

Given these new priorities, the announced cap for aid, and perhaps additional annual uncertainty on aid levels, the impact on existing CIDA programs is likely to be be significant. The government has repeatedly affirmed the doubling of aid to Africa as an important achievement. But it will be very difficult to sustain current levels of funding for Africa in the context of an aid freeze if CIDA must meet other aid priorities out of very limited uncommitted funds in any given year.
Many Canadian organizations have been calling on the government to join other donors in setting out a plan to reach the 0.7% target with planned increases that would average 14% per year. The Conservative plan not only fails to meet this goal,  it reneges on a promise to bring Canadian aid up to the average of other donor nations and  runs counter to commitments Canada made in 2008 at the Accra High Level Forum, where it agreed to increase the predictability of Canadian aid in the years ahead. 
Canada is a "global leader and continuously demonstrates this by honouring its international commitments," says the budget.   It is hard to see how.

Canada and Africa: Facing away from Mount Kenya

n 1938, Kenya’s future president, Jomo Kenyatta, wrote a book about the Gikuyu people entitled Facing Mount Kenya. In 2009, after decades of development programming in Kenya, Canada decided to face away from Mount Kenya, and from seven other countries where it had longstanding aid programs, partnerships and influence. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, and Zambia are now off the CIDA list as countries of interest.
From a total of seven Francophone African countries, CIDA has now reduced its focus to two. African countries of focus for CIDA are now Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania.
The move to greater geographic focus came after years of criticism, mainly from the OECD, that CIDA was geographically too scattered. This criticism had also been leveled by the OECD in most recent DAC peer reviews of Britain, France, Germany and other bilateral donors. No attempt was made by the OECD, however, to coordinate the ‘focus’ that it sought. The result is that Ghana and Mozambique, for example, are now focus countries for Canada and a dozen other bilateral donors, while most have abandoned countries of much greater need, such as DRC, Liberia and Sierra Leone.
‘We’re not abandoning any countries,’ CIDA Minister Bev Oda said, announcing the cuts during a media scrum in February 2009. ‘What we’re saying is we’ve selected 20 countries in which we will focus our programming.’¹ CIDA President, Margaret Biggs explained it this way: the countries that appear on CIDA’s revised list were selected on the basis of three criteria. Need was the first, she said. Canada’s ability to engage with a country in a meaningful way was the second. And the third criterion was a foreign-policy consideration. ²
‘These are interesting criteria,’ writes Gerry Barr, Executive Director of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, ‘but they have nothing to do with the ODA Accountability Act. A legal rationale of the Act, commissioned by the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, finds that the Act’s three criteria for ODA (contributes to poverty reduction; takes into account the perspectives of the poor; and is consistent with international human rights standards) should be equal in weight, interdependent, cumulative and the only criteria to be rightly applied by a competent Minister when deciding on aid spending.’³
Minister Oda, for her part, says ‘For many countries formerly on Canada’s list, little will change, since much of their Canadian aid was delivered through our multilateral and partnership programs.’
That is not exactly true. Six African countries chopped from the list were among the top 30 recipients of Canadian bilateral aid in 2006-7, as was Sri Lanka, another dropped country (and the recipient of Canada’s very first ODA under the Colombo Plan). By cutting its bilateral programs to these countries, CIDA will ‘save’ about $185 million. That is a lot of money for poor countries, and it cannot mean that ‘little will change’ unless the aid was not accomplishing much in the first place.
But there is another question. If ‘little will change’, why make the change? Why the points about ‘need’, ‘Canada’s ability to engage in meaningful ways’ and ‘foreign policy considerations’? Why make any cuts at all?
It has been said, though never as an overt policy, that Canada wants to be among the top five donors in a given recipient country. By refocusing on a few, Canada could become a bigger player. This would presumably give CIDA more policy leverage.
The truth is, however, that in most African countries, Canadian aid volumes – even if they were to double – would never be competitive with those of larger donors, especially in countries where there is already donor crowding.
Canada is a minor player in most of the new countries of focus. Canadian ODA in 2008 represented more than 10% of all ODA in only three of the African focus countries (Ghana 10.2%, Senegal 13.4%, Mali 18.6%).⁴ If all of the $185 million saved by cutting programs were distributed proportionally among the remaining four, Canada would still not reach 10% of total ODA in any of them. Canada, in fact, can never buy its way to relevance. And ‘leverage’ – in a real partnership – should derive from the quality of programming, not the size of the budget.
Other questions arise:

• Can Canada engage more meaningfully in Ethiopia or Sudan than it could in Zambia or Rwanda?
• Are the needs greater in Mali than in Peru?
• Are our foreign policy considerations greater in Mozambique than they are in Kenya?

If the answer to these questions is yes, there has yet to be a public discussion on the subject.
Six of the eight dropped African countries are among the 20 poorest countries in the world, falling into what the United Nations euphemistically calls ‘low human development’. All have serious deficiencies in maternal and child health, Canada’s new high-priority programming area.
Four of the seven countries of focus fall into the ‘medium human development’ category, while the new South American countries of focus fall into the ‘high human development’ category. However CIDA defines ‘need’, the choices it has made seem to ignore need, and the possibility that Canada might make a real difference with small amounts in countries that have been abandoned by other donors.
There is a further issue, however. African growth rates over the past decade have been relatively high. Africa has become a focus of investment not just for China, but for Canadian companies. Africa is not just an aid recipient, it is a continent of great promise, and it is in Canada’s interest to remain engaged.
CANADA: ON TRACK IN DOUBLING ITS AID TO AFRICA?
CIDA’s annual statistical report for 2006-7 stated that ‘Budget 2008 reconfirmed the government’s commitment to double its international assistance to Africa in 2008-9 over 2003-4 levels.’
CIDA’s statistics for 2006-7 show that Canadian international assistance to Africa rose from $1.05 billion in 2003-4 to $1.89 billion in 2006-7 – almost double, as claimed.
In these numbers, however, there is subterfuge. First, in reporting to Canadians, CIDA speaks of ‘international assistance’, and counts a variety of outlays that are not eligible for inclusion as ODA. For example CIDA shows expenditures of $142.17 million in Sudan but some $70 million of this was support to African Union (AU) peacekeeping that could not be counted as ODA. Some $56 million was spent on humanitarian relief, leaving a tiny amount, some $7.1 million, for bilateral development programming – one third of what was spent in the same year in six of the seven countries that were dropped by CIDA.
This is not to suggest that what Canada is doing in Sudan is unimportant, or that any of it should be stopped. But in terms of long-term development commitments, Canada has much less invested in Sudan than every single one of the countries it dropped from the list. CIDA is not likely on this basis to be able to ‘engage in meaningful ways’ with Sudan.
Canada’s second largest aid recipient in the entire world in 2006-7 was Cameroon, a country now dropped from the list. Total ‘expenditure’ on Cameroon was stated as $224 million, although all but $9 million of this was debt relief. While debt relief is a real cost to the donor and a real benefit to the beneficiary, it does not represent new money for new activities.
If the non ODA spending in Sudan and the debt relief to Cameroon alone are removed from the calculation of the increase in Canadian ‘aid’ to Africa, the growth falls from 80% over the four years in question to more like 53%. In a year when ODA increased by 7%, the statistics for 2007-8 actually show a fallback in ‘aid’ to Africa from the dubious 2006-7 figure of $1.89 billion to $1.74 billion.⁵
What will emerge in the statistics for 2008 and beyond remains uncertain. The $500 million Canada Fund for Africa was closed in 2008, and it is not at all clear that the ‘savings’ on closed programs will be reallocated within Africa. Funding will have to be found for CIDA’s new programs in middle income Colombia and Peru. If Canada aimed to reach 10% of ODA to Colombia, it would have to increase aid spending there by 625% over 2008 figures.
With the likelihood of a slowdown in ODA (if not cuts) to deal with post-recession deficits, there may well be no significant growth in aid for the African countries that are the centre of new ‘focus’. In fact funds may well be diverted to Colombia and Peru. In the process, Canada will simply have lost a generation of experience and investment in eight very poor countries where we once made a difference.⁶
On top of all this, Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon has added to the confusion by saying (in February 2010) that Canada will not commit to any further increase in African aid until it is satisfied the $2 billion it has already delivered has not been wasted. He said that Canada has fulfilled its aid promises to Africa and now wants to use its G8 chairmanship to ensure accountability for the money already spent.⁷
This suggests that Canada has been pumping money into Africa – ‘doubling’ the amount in five years, four of them under the Conservative government -- without any assurance about where it has gone or how it has been used. If Canada’s Foreign Minister is this concerned about our aid to Africa, why was it doubled?  The truth is probably more complicated. Canada wants to take credit for ‘doubling’ its aid to Africa at the G8 summit, but knows that real spending has been dropping, and will drop further in 2010. The drop can be explained later as a concern ‘to assure accountability’, while simply facilitating the move away from Africa.
Juliette Yameogo Ambassador to Canada from Burkina Faso attended a Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee meeting along with 18 other African ambassadors in May, 2009. She asked why so many of the countries that had been dropped had not been consulted prior to Minister Oda’s press conference in Ottawa. Almost all of them learned of the cuts through the media.
‘Canada was a friend who understood the challenges of Africa,’ Yameogo said. ‘For us, Canada is a country where its citizens stand solidly with oppressed people both at home and elsewhere in the world. In international gatherings, Canada has always stood shoulder to shoulder with Africa in defense of our continent’s interest.’ She asked, ‘Are we to believe that our long time friend, Canada, is leaving? …We would like our friend Canada to come back to Africa.’⁸
WHAT CANADA SHOULD DO IN AFRICA

• POVERTY MUST BE THE CENTRAL FOCUS: Over the years, Canadian aid has frequently lost sight of its poverty-reducing mandate and focus. This must be reconfirmed in our geographic and sectoral priorities in Africa.
• REVIEW THE CUTS: While it makes sense to focus on some countries and some sectors, there has been no discussion about the dramatic choices that have been made over the past two years with the many Canadian organizations, companies and academics whose long experience of Africa has created unique partnerships and opportunities. The options must be reviewed, along with the overall and relative levels of Canadian assistance to Africa.
• NOT JUST “BETTER PERFORMERS”: Many donors, including Canada, have sought out countries deemed to be “better performers” as a way of achieving better results. This has turned some countries with great needs, often emerging from conflict and bad governance, into “aid orphans”. In coordination with other donors, Canada should take on at least one or two “fragile” African countries as special cases for Canadian attention, as we have with Haiti.
• REVIEW THE SECTORAL PRIORITIES: CIDA has changed course on its priorities so many times in the past decade that Canada has become a jack of all trades and master of none. Do the current priorities make sense in all regions and all countries? What do they mean for organizations responding to requests from Africa? How rigidly will the priorities be interpreted? How closely must independent Canadian organizations follow CIDA’s lead? These questions and others need to be considered in consultation with African partners in establishing realistic long-term directions for Canadian development assistance.
• THE CASE FOR BUSINESS: For many years Canada has prioritized private sector development. In Africa this has focused almost exclusively on the creation of opportunities for Canadian investors and exporters. The development of small and medium African enterprise has been ignored by most donors, including Canada. SME is the engine of economic growth in North America, Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. CIDA should take a long hard look at whether Canada has skills, experience and institutions that could turn this neglected area – and a priority for Africa – into a priority for Canada.
• STAY THE COURSE:  Once there has been full consultation on geographic and sectoral priorities, there must be a bipartisan political agreement that Canada will remain true to the directions that have been set, and not permit a return to the constant changes that have weakened our aid programs.
• DECENTRALIZE: Several Canadian governments, including the current one, have committed to greater decentralization in decision making, understanding that better and more timely decisions can be taken closer to the beneficiaries and field operations. It hasn’t happened. Meaningful authority must be moved to country-level offices.
• CIVIL SOCIETY: Expand the role of African and Canadian civil society organizations in designing and implementing the ODA program.
• ENGAGEMENT WITH CANADIANS: We have recommended elsewhere that 5 per cent of Canada’s ODA budget be allocated to robust and dynamic engagement with Canadians. This should have a clear and sustained Africa focus.

NOTES

¹http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2009/02/23/cida-foreignaid.html [back]

² http://www.straight.com/article-222932/ottawacida-refocused-international-aid-foreign-policy-mind [back]

³ Gerry Barr, ‘ODA Accountability Act: Remarkable Legislation, Disappointing Implementation’, in Canadian Council for International Cooperation, A Time to Act: Implementing the ODA Accountability Act: A Canadian CSO Agenda for Aid Reform, CCIC, forthcoming April 2010, accessible at www.ccic.ca. [back]

⁴2008 statistics on relative shares of ODA are from the OECD DAC data base: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=ODA_RECIPIENT [back]

⁵ In fact if debt forgiveness and the non-ODA aid to Sudan are removed from both years, the comparable figures show a very slight increase, from $1.6 billion to $1.67 billion. [back]

⁶ The 2007-8 Statistical Report states that ‘On 20 May 2009, Canada announced its achievement of [the doubling] target. A website reference for the announcement is incorrect. The Statistical Report states that the ‘exact total’ showing the 2008-09 ‘target set and achieved by the Canadian government’ will be reported at a later date. See http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/stats/$file/Statistical_Report_InternationalL_Assistance_2007-2008_EN.pdf [back]

⁷ http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=n161367419 [back]

⁸ http://www2.macleans.ca/2009/05/29/we-would-like-to-ask-our-friend-canada-to-come-back-to-africa/ [back]